The breakaway region of Transnistria, Moldova, has been one of the biggest enigmas in Eastern Europe for the past three decades and continues to be a special case study, being one of the first frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space and then a model for what followed around the Black Sea` basin.
The survival dynamics of this entity is even more interesting due to the antagonistic realities in the field. If in the first two decades it survived thanks to the economic support provided by Moscow, the last decade paradoxically belongs to the European Union and Chisinau.
A Bolshevik FOB also used by post-Soviet Russia
The current situation in Transnistria dates back to 1992 and is the result, on the one hand, of the war on the Dniester River, which opposed Moldovan troops to Tiraspol’s rebel backed by volunteers and Russian forces of the 14th Army, and on the other hand, of the July 21st, 1992,
Convention on the Principles of Peaceful Settlement of Armed Conflict in the Dniester Area of the Republic of Moldova on July 21, 1992, after several months of fighting between Chisinau and the rebels of the Tiraspol regime, supported by Russian forces.
However, the roots of this entity have their origins since 1924, when Moscow ordered the creation, within the Ukrainian SSR, of the Autonomous Moldovan SSR, which was designed as a buffer zone between Ukraine and Romania.
At that time, the stake of this strip of land was to export the Soviet Revolution via Romania to the Balkans. Today, this separatist region has the role of functioning as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for Moscow in the Odesa region, Ukraine and about 100 kilometres from the EU and NATO border with Romania.
The separatist region represents about 11-12 per cent of the total area of Moldova.
In the approximately 28 years of so-called independence, Transnistria has functioned economically from the Soviet remnants of a fragile industry strategically placed on the left bank of the Dniester River.
At the same time, the breakaway region of Transnistria has survived due to underground economic life. Over the years it became a smuggling platform, especially for cigarettes and alcoholic beverages, but also weapons, especially from the warehouses in Cobasna, where the Soviets relocated in the 80s and in the early 1990s some 20,000 tons of ammunition previously-stored in countries like East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
From this point of view, the endemic corruption in Chisinau and the business of some politicians and the interconnected interest groups in Chisinau and Tiraspol have helped to maintain this status quo.
The EU, Bucharest and Chisinau are throwing the lifeline for the separatist region
In the past decade, the Transnistrian economy has undergone a number of interesting changes, with the burden shifted from Moscow’s shoulders to those of the European Union.
The “soft power” approach that the European Union implemented, initially through the Eastern Partnership levers in 2009 and then by signing the EU-Moldova Association Agreement in June 2014, played a decisive role in changing the balance of exports in the breakaway region.
The numbers speak for themselves. Today, around 30% of Transnistrian exports reach markets in some 25 EU countries.
On the first three places regarding the share of exports from the secessionist region are metals and metal products (about 229 million US dollars), energy resources and fuel (160 million US dollars – delivered to Moldova) and last but not least food products (about 96 million US million dollars), raw materials and garments under the lohn regime (52 million US dollars). Total exports from the Transnistrian region in 2020 amounted to 633,105,050 million dollars, according to statistics provided by the Customs Service of the Tiraspol regime.
Paradoxically, Romania is the main destination for Transnistrian goods. Even if at a propagandistic and ideological level, Bucharest remains the biggest enemy of Tiraspol towards which all negative political rhetoric is directed.
In general, trade between the separatist region and Romania is limited to metal products that go to processing in the steel plant in Rabnita up in the north of the region.
The latest figures provided by the Tiraspol regime show that in 2020, Moldova was the main destination of the Transnistrian exports (especially electricity from the Cuciurgan power plant) with 42.92 per cent of market share and a value of 271.7 million US dollars (increasing by about 10 per cent compared to 2019).
Romania ranked second with 14.91 per cent (94 million US dollars) with almost 2 per cent increase compared to 2019. Russia is following with 11.05 per cent of exports (almost 70 million dollars). On fourth place is Ukraine with 10.26 per cent of exports (almost $ 65 million.)
It’s worth mentioning that Romania, along with Poland, Italy and Germany, absorbs around 80 per cent of total Transnistrian exports to the EU. Another interesting transformation is that starting with 2015, Romania took over from Russia in terms of the first destination of Transnistrian exports.
Crimea`s annexation, an inflexion point
The dynamics of Transnistrian exports have undergone major changes in its structure over the last decade.
This happened at an increased pace after the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 and after the embargo imposed since 2013 on Moldova by Moscow. The figures show that Romania jumped sharply in 2015 from 18.6 per cent to 30.5 per cent, while Russia fell from 22.9 per cent to 15.2 per cent.
The mathematical reality is shaped also by a well-developed European Union policy that allowed the Transnistrian region to continue exporting to the EU, after the signing of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement in June 2014, without making public the agreements with Tiraspol.
Romania, as the closest EU state in the vicinity of the separatist region, has taken over this role of state-importer of Transnistrian products via Moldova. However, what is interesting is that the relationship was not reciprocal. Despite the facile policies from the EU, Tiraspol has raised tariffs on products imported from the European Union.
Brussels has motivated its relaxed policy towards Tiraspol as a way to prevent a series of incidents that might be caused by the economical blockades imposed by Chisinau and Kyiv. This would have strangled the Transnistrian economy and there could have been a risk of armed clashes. However, the Russian military presence in the secessionist republic could have further complicated the situation on the ground.
After the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Kyiv changed its tolerant attitude towards Tiraspol and introduced a gradual embargo, both for goods and for the movement of people. In addition, the controls on common customs points were tightened.
As the Transnistrian region has no international airport and no access to its own sea, the “rescue exports” to Russia have fully diminished and have been reoriented to the countries by Brussels` goodwill.
Source: https://www.veridica.ro/analyses
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