Author: Mădălin Necșuțu
The EU has extended an economic lifeline to Transnistria, the underlying idea being that this would help avoid conflict in that region. Russia is no longer Transnistria’s main economic partner, but still has considerable levarage in the region. Moscow is providing gas, sanctioning the lucrative cryptocurrency mining business, maintaining troops in the breakaway region, and exerting political levarage – but it doesn’t use it for conflict resolution.
Uneven negotiations
For the past 28 years, Tiraspol has stubbornly refused to negotiate the political side of the settlement.
It insists on obtaining socio-economic concessions from Chisinau and in return offers reduced pressure on some sensitive issues artificially created by Tiraspol to be used as a tool or bargaining leverage.
Among them are the teaching of the Romanian language in Latin script in schools or the access of farmers to the lands they own along the so-called “demarcation line” between the secessionist region and the rest of Moldova.
Currently, such an artificially created problem is the unilateral location, during the COVID-19 pandemic, of about 37 new checkpoints so that later their lifting can be negotiated in exchange for new economic concessions from Chisinau.
It is worth mentioning here that all the negotiations on the part of Tiraspol have Moscow behind them, a state that decisively influences the difficult course of negotiations through the entire Transnistrian governing apparatus educated in Moscow and which is under the total control of the Kremlin.
On the other hand, in the negotiations on this issue, Russia has apparently weakened its inflexible position on Transnistria amid the 2008 global economic crisis that continues today for the Russian Federation.
Until the economic crisis, Russia massively pumped money into the Transnistrian region in the form of humanitarian aid, money that went mainly to social aspects like pensions and salaries. The figures were around 60 million US dollars annually.
As a result of the global economic crisis, the depreciation of the Russian ruble and in general the difficult economic situation in Moscow caused by international sanctions, Moscow reduced its appetite to provide money to Tiraspol and allowed it to open this economic valve to the EU.
In addition, Gazprom’s gas supplied to the Transnistrian region has not been paid since 2007. For about 14 years, Moldovagaz’s debt to Gazprom has reached around seven billion dollars, of which over 90% is only Tiraspol’s debt.
This aspect could slow down the scenario of the reunification of Moldova in view of the impossibility of paying such a debt accumulated by its separatist region.
Gazprom owns a 51% majority stake in Moldovagaz, while the Economy Ministry holds 35.5 per cent, and the remaining 13.44 per cent are owned by Tiraspol, but managed by Gazprom.
Shifting to the cryptocurrency business
However, Moscow has also begun to find an even better strategy for the cheap energy produced at the Cuciurgan power plant, owned by the Russian company Inter RAO EES, and how to make better use of the gas delivered by Gazprom in the breakaway region.
According to statements by the head of the separatist government in Tiraspol, Alexandr Martinov, the secessionist republic was betting, for 2019, on the amount of 15.5 million dollars that will reach a special government account. Thus, Gazprom’s gas was transformed into electricity at the Cuciurgan plant, and then it was used in the energy-intensive mining activity for cryptocurrencies.
The mining business was set in motion quickly with the involvement of Moldova’s ambassador to the „Delovaia Russia” business association, Igor Chaika, the son of former Russian General Prosecutor, Yuri Chaika. He has a friendly and business relationship with Moldovan former President Igor Dodon and his family, but also with the separatist leader from Tiraspol, Vadim Krasnoselsky.
Chaika also intervened in the drafting and the early adoption of the legislation, so that on January 31, 2018, he already promoted the crypto-currency business in Transnistria in an interview for Kommersant.
In fact, the offshore company GoWeb International, led by a former employee of the Russian Interior Ministry, immediately began selling $ 90 million worth of tokens to foreign investors interested in cryptocurrency business opportunities produced in Transnistria.
It is worth mentioning that the FBI “Mueller report”, which investigated Moscow’s meddling in the US presidential election, says that the operations of the Russian special services for paying for advertisements for several social networks were done with cryptocurrency.
Allowing the development of this type of business in the separatist regions controlled by Moscow, which currently take place in Transnistria (Moldova), Donbas and Crimea (Ukraine) and Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) is a new way for people in the Kremlin’s entourage to economically support these regimes, but also money laundering and financing the separatism.
In fact, the region risks becoming even more criminalized than it already is. Cryptocurrencies are increasingly used in operations specific to organized crime, from drug trafficking to terrorist financing or various intelligence operations.
Negotiations in limbo
During the 28 years since the end of the Dniester War and the ceasefire agreement, the “Transnistrian dossier” has been delayed in order to maintain the status quo that provided for Russia’s military presence on the territory of Moldova in the breakaway region of Transnistria.
First of all, it is about the military advantage maintained by Russia in the region through the approximately 1,500 – 2,000 Russian soldiers assigned to the Western Military District of the Russian Army, based in Saint Petersburg.
Their mission is to guard one of the largest ammunition depots in Eastern Europe, namely Cobasna, where it is estimated that about 20,000 tons of ammunition are stored. However, the Russian soldiers are ordered to do shifts also as “peacemakers” in the joint peacekeeping mission of Moldovan, Transnistrian, Ukrainian and Russian soldiers.
This military material base, together with the Russian military and the Transnistrian army estimated at 10,000 to 15,000 people in several law enforcement institutions, are the premises and strong arguments for the current situation in which it is not possible to advance on this conflict settlement.
Although it was effectively engaged in the 1992 military confrontations by the Transnistrian rebels, Russia later became an international 5 + 2 mediator in the conflict settlement case and de facto uses the Transnistrian “paradiplomacy” to influence the course of this case.
Hence, the modest results in negotiations and the absolute avoidance of any political negotiations, in the 5 + 2 format, which could lead to the political resolution of the conflict.
While Chisinau has not changed its position and offers Tiraspol a wide autonomy within Moldova, on the model already existing in Autonomous Gagauzia region, the Transnistrian separatist region takes into account only the recognition by Chisinau and even the scenario of becoming legally a subject of law of the Russian Federation.
In a referendum on September 17, 2006, 97 per cent of the inhabitants of the separatist region voted in favour of Transnistria’s accession to the Russian Federation.
Source: https://www.veridica.ro/analyses
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