Analysis by Dionis Cenușa
Sanctions against Russia, albeit belated, are Ukraine’s vital tool in fighting the Russian invasion after receiving foreign military aid. The first Western sanctions with a significant economic impact were triggered immediately after Russia’s recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Luhansk and Donbas (February 23). The others quickly followed after the start of the war on February 24.
Even after more than three weeks of war, Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy reiterates that the West is behind on sanctions. In his opinion, these could be introduced as a preventive measure to deter Moscow (Interfax, March 2022). Nevertheless, this approach has been ignored on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the sanctions regime was developed and coordinated in advance, Washington and European capitals did not want to apply it preemptively. They saw the hasty application as a tactical weakness, which would have undermined its effectiveness. Instead, the focus was on direct negotiations with Russia, which the latter used to feign goodwill until the start of the military assault on Ukraine (simultaneously on three fronts: north, south and east). However, the current sanctions are affecting the Russian economy, but still do not have the necessary impact to stop the destruction, loss of life and Russian territorial occupation in Ukraine.
Virtually all of the sanctions, except for blocking oil, gas and coal exports, were launched between February 23 and March 22. Unlike the US, which has given up buying energy resources traded by Russia (White House, March 2022), EU countries are reluctant to make sharp moves in the same direction due to excessive energy dependence on Russia . The EU and Member States are preparing to get rid of the dependence on natural gas (2/3) by the end of 2022 and are looking for solutions to replace oil and coal imports, including increasing investment in renewable energy by 2030. In fact, the diversification of energy imports in the EU should have started 8 years ago, immediately after Russia’s territorial seizures in Ukraine (Crimea, the separatist territories of Luhansk and Donbas) and instead of promoting the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and renew natural gas contracts with Russia. Sanctions against Russian oligarchs with confiscation of assets also seem late and should have been introduced two years ago, after the attempted poisoning of Aleksey Navalniy (in 2020). Last but not least, the comprehensive sanction of the Lakashenko regime, which played a key role in launching the Russian invasion, was justified in 2021, after the forced landing of Ryanair and the triggering of the migration crisis at the border with the EU (IPN, November 2021). The imposition of non-preventive sanctions, as well as the untimely and inadequate sanctioning of Russia and its geopolitical allies (Lukashenko’s regime) for their actions fueled the Kremlin’s sense of impunity and probably even inspired Putin to launch a full-scale war against Ukraine.
Source: https://www.ipn.md