Analysis of Dionis Cenușa
The outbreak of the Russian war against Ukraine at the end of February naturally increased the interest of Eastern European states with a pro-European agenda for a qualitative update of the relationship with the European Union (EU). Practically, throughout the Russian aggression (still continuous), Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have channeled their diplomatic efforts towards the objective of obtaining the status of candidates for accession to the EU. The application and completion of the questionnaires, which took place in March-May, is now followed by the announcement of the EU verdict. The European Commission will comment on the application for membership submitted by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in the coming days (June 17). Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stressed that the decision on Ukraine’s candidacy will influence the “future of Europe” (Interfax, June 2022). Obviously, there is no explicit causal link between the sustainability of the EU project and the prospect of accession (for the moment, not guaranteed) of Ukraine.
However, the situation in this country becomes an unavoidable responsibility of the EU, if it wants to (re)acquire a sense of regional security on its eastern flank. For this reason, the offer of EU candidate status for Ukraine has a meaning that goes far beyond geopolitical symbolism, based on the collective Western resistance against Russian militarist revisionism. Therefore, the candidate status has an urgent practical utility that, in addition to stabilizing European security, also includes the strategic objective of post-war reconstruction in the immediate vicinity of the EU.
Member States’ positions on Ukraine’s candidature differ. While Poland, Lithuania and other Baltic states, as well as Ireland and Italy, support Kyiv’s move, Denmark and the Netherlands would have the biggest reservations. They believe that the institutional and legislative parameters in Ukraine need to be improved before granting candidate status (Bloomberg, June 2022). Indirectly, Danish-Dutch objections would also automatically affect the attitude towards Moldova and Georgia. For political and strategic reasons, the other two Eastern European countries implementing the association agreements cannot be favored to the detriment of Ukraine, which is a priority in most European capitals and in Brussels. At the same time, Ukraine’s success will have a positive domino effect on others. At the same time, the non-approval of Ukraine’s candidacy could block the path of Georgia and Moldova.
The race for the candidacy takes place separately in the three associated countries. Ukraine uses a combination of moral and technical arguments. On the one hand, the EU is called upon to support the Ukrainian cause, where the idea prevails that the Ukrainian state defends itself against Russia both for reasons of national defense and for European ideals. On the other hand, the Ukrainian side recalls that some progress has been made in the area of reforms, in particular in the fight against corruption and justice, even in times of war. Moldova is next in line, actively promoting the pro-candidacy approach. The dominant arguments are related to the historical-linguistic proximity, through the Romanian identity affiliation, and the reformist intentions of the government. Unlike the reforms in Ukraine, the Moldovan ones have a lower probative value, because the new generation of structural reforms related to the fight against corruption, the modernization of institutional capacities or the judiciary have started very recently. In the case of Georgia, the authorities are trapped in a negative external image, the result of mistrust of the ruling party and the mishandling of scandals related to the power-opposition relationship, the influence of the oligarchs (Bidzina Ivanishvili), the persecution opposition media, repeated breach of human rights. Although the perception of endemic corruption in Georgia is lower than in the Western Balkans, but also in Ukraine and Moldova, the EU is skeptical of the Georgian authorities and blames them for the decline of democratic institutions. However, instead of demonstrating a radical change of attitude at home, Georgian decision-makers are attacking critical voices in the European Parliament, accused of a kind of political “collaboration” with the main Georgian opposition forces.
In this diverse local and regional context, there are three main scenarios for the evolution of EU applications among the “associated trio”.
Scenario 1: Ukraine – “first in line” (1 + 2)
Ukraine has the best chance of gaining candidate status, ahead of Moldova and Georgia. The country is the first of the “associated trio” to apply and complete the EU questionnaire. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ireland and Italy spoke in favor of running for Ukraine. The European Commission also supports this option, especially as the EU institutions realize that candidate status will boost the morale behind Ukraine’s defense against Russian aggression
This scenario corresponds to Kyiv’s request to take advantage of Georgia and Moldova, which have joined Ukraine’s initiative to capitalize on the regional context and openness of decision-makers in Brussels. If the EU and member states decide to make this scenario a reality, then the “associated trio” could end up splitting. As a result, Ukraine will be separated from Georgia and Moldova, which could be given the status of a potential candidate or simply a concrete European perspective. Subsequently, the governments of Tbilisi and Chisinau could facilitate their rapprochement in favor of the candidacy by invoking the Ukrainian precedent.
Scenario 2: Ukraine and Moldova: only two potential candidates (2 + 1)
Another twist in the bid for EU membership focuses on Ukraine and Moldova. Both have the support of the European Commission and are closely watched both in terms of the stability of democratic institutions and the relationship with the Russian factor. In this context, it is omitted that Georgia was the victim of Russian aggression as early as 2008, six years before the annexation of Crimea and the establishment of militarized separatism in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
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